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Abstract
■ Space, time, and causality provide a natural structure for
organizing our experience. These abstract categories allow us
to think relationally in the most basic sense; understanding sim-
ple events requires one to represent the spatial relations among
objects, the relative durations of actions or movements, and the
links between causes and effects. The present fMRI study inves-
tigates the extent to which the brain distinguishes between
these fundamental conceptual domains. Participants performed
a 1-back task with three conditions of interest (space, time,
and causality). Each condition required comparing relations
between events in a simple verbal narrative. Depending on
the condition, participants were instructed to either attend to
the spatial, temporal, or causal characteristics of events, but be-
tween participants each particular event relation appeared in
all three conditions. Contrasts compared neural activity during
each condition against the remaining two and revealed how
thinking about events is deconstructed neurally. Space trials
recruited neural areas traditionally associated with visuospatial
processing, primarily bilateral frontal and occipitoparietal net-
works. Causality trials activated areas previously found to under-
lie causal thinking and thematic role assignment, such as left
medial frontal and left middle temporal gyri, respectively. Cau-
sality trials also produced activations in SMA, caudate, and cer-
ebellum; cortical and subcortical regions associated with the
perception of time at different timescales. The time contrast,
however, produced no significant effects. This pattern, indicat-
ing negative results for time trials but positive effects for cau-
sality trials in areas important for time perception, motivated
additional overlap analyses to further probe relations between
domains. The results of these analyses suggest a closer corre-
spondence between time and causality than between time and
space. ■
INTRODUCTION
Space, time, and causality hold a privileged place in the
history of philosophy. Together, these abstract categories
provide a basis for organizing our experiences. To make
sense of a simple event, it is necessary to represent (1)
the spatial relations among objects relative to the general
topography of a scene, (2) the durations of actions or
movements for particular objects relative to one another,
and (3) the relations between causes and effects (or lack
thereof). As such, space, time, and causality provide a gen-
eral framework for organizing and structuring our knowl-
edge about events as they unfold in the world. Attempts
to describe and reconcile these domains represent a
common thread linking ancient and early modern phi-
losophies. For philosophers, questions regarding space,
time, and causality have primarily related to ontology, or
philosophical investigations concerning the underlying
physical reality of these basic domains in and of themselves,
and epistemology, or how knowledge is acquired and or-
ganized. Fundamental questions regarding the domains
of space, time, and causality in philosophy often concern
the extent to which each has a reducible, independent
structure and how they interact with one another, both in
the world and the mind (Newton, 1687/2005; Hume, 1739/
2003; Aristotle, 1999; Kant, 1781/1998; Locke, 1690/1995;
Plato, 1977).
Complementing philosophical approaches, more re-
cent cognitive and behavioral neuroscience methods
have independently investigated the neural bases for per-
ceiving the spatial, temporal, and causal components of
simple arrays (Coslett, Wiener, & Chatterjee, 2010; Wencil,
Coslett, Aguirre, & Chatterjee, 2010; Wiener, Turkeltaub, &
Coslett, 2010; Eagleman et al., 2005; Fugelsang, Roser,
Corballis, Gazzaniga, & Dunbar, 2005; Schubotz & von
Cramon, 2001; Coull, Frith, Buchel, & Nobre, 2000; Colby,
1998; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Haxby et al., 1991). Impor-
tantly, experimental research has also explored the in-
teraction of these three domains dynamically. Using what
Michotte (1946/1963) first termed “launching events” (sim-
ple collisions between “billiard ball-like” stimuli), behav-
ioral research, particularly in the area of infant cognition
(Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 2002; Leslie,
1984), and more recent cognitive neuroscience approaches
with adults (Straube & Chatterjee, 2010) have sought to
define the cognitive and neural bases for separable spatial1Duquesne University, 2University of Pennsylvania, 3Hope College
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and temporal components of perceived causality when
viewing dynamic events. These studies tend to systemati-
cally vary the relative salience or strength of either spatial
or temporal cues to determine how such manipulations
influence the perception of causality.
However, the perception of spatial, temporal, and
causal information can be distinguished from our concep-
tion of these basic categories of experience. For example,
discriminating between a tone presented for either 100
or 6000 msec is different from knowing that a minute is
shorter than an hour. Similarly, perceiving a causal relation
between two balls during a simple collision event is differ-
ent than understanding the causal mechanism for more
complex events where the relation is not necessarily as
concrete or transparent (e.g., understanding the germ
theory of disease). The distinction between perceptual
and conceptual levels of representation is particularly evi-
dent when information from each is at odds with one
another. For example, if I sneeze and a nearby lamp in
my office turns on, I may perceive a causal relation be-
tween these two events based on their spatial and temporal
contiguity—although I know that sneezes do not turn on
lights. That is, I experience the “perceptual illusion” of
causality—or so it would seem. If, later in the day, my col-
league informs me that our new office lamps are equipped
with energy-efficient, motion-sensitive light switches, I can
further revise my understanding of the relation between
cause and effect with respect to these two events con-
nected in space and time. Reasoning about events in such
a flexible manner is made possible by our abilities to think
abstractly.
Although studies of spatial, temporal, and causal concepts
are in relatively short supply in cognitive neuroscience,
work focusing on such abstract concepts is accumulating.
At present, independent investigations of space and cau-
sality have received the most attention in this regard. For
example, several investigations of spatial concepts (e.g.,
studies looking at the neural bases for spatial prepositions
and categorical spatial relations) suggest that, in general,
the left hemisphere, more than the right, processes ab-
stract spatial relations across both verbal and nonverbal
tasks and that, in particular, inferior parietal cortex and
parts of dorsolateral pFC including inferior and posterior
middle frontal gyri are important for representing spatial
relational knowledge (Amorapanth, Widick, & Chatterjee,
2010; Noordzij, Neggers, Ramsey,& Postma, 2008; Emmorey
et al., 2002; Damasio et al., 2001; Kosslyn, Thompson,
Gitelman, & Alpert, 1998; Kosslyn et al., 1989; Kosslyn,
1987). In the domain of causality, nonverbal tasks have
contrasted conceptual causality with perceptual causality,
finding evidence for a dissociation between these distinct
types of causal judgments, and a left hemisphere speciali-
zation for abstracting causal relations (Roser, Fugelsang,
Dunbar, Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2005). In particular, the
medial frontal cortex appears to be involved (Fonlupt,
2003). Using a verbal task, Satpute and colleagues (2005)
found that causal judgments, more than judgments about
semantic associations, increased activation in left dorsolat-
eral cortex and right precuneus.
Neural studies examining temporal concepts are the
least represented (Teuscher, McQuire, Collins, & Coulson,
2008; Kemmerer, 2005). Notably, these studies tend to
investigate cross-domain mappings between time and
space. For example, in a study investigating the relations
between space, time, and the semantics of prepositions,
Kemmerer (2005) found a double dissociation for impaired
comprehension of spatial or temporal semantics in pa-
tients, wherein the left supramarginal gyrus was found to
be important for representing the spatial meaning of pre-
positions. Regions important for representing temporal
meanings were not as clearly defined. However, the left
peri-sylvian cortex was implicated. The results suggest that
the spatial and temporal meanings of locative prepositions
are represented separately. These particular results, in
conjunction with the relative scarcity of neural studies in-
vestigating temporal concepts in general, suggest that time
may be more difficult to localize both functionally and
anatomically as compared with other abstract concepts. It
is not surprising that dissociating the unique neural com-
ponents of spatial, temporal, and causal concepts should
be difficult considering that several well-known current
theories in the cognitive sciences point out that language
frequently uses spatial and/or causal metaphors to repre-
sent other abstract concepts—especially time—and that
these patterns of lexicalization reveal something important
about the structure of our conceptual system (Casasanto,
2009; Wolpert, 2006; Boroditsky, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson,
1999).
Thus, it may be even more important to consider that
research addressing the neural bases for abstract concepts
like space, time, and causality, specifically as they relate to
one another, is lacking (but see Speer, Reynolds, Swallow,
& Zacks, 2009). Given the current general interest in inter-
actions among these conceptual domains from cognitive
linguistics, simulation theories, and other sensorimotor
or embodied cognition accounts of semantic represen-
tation (Chatterjee, 2010; Casasanto, 2009; Zwaan, 2004;
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Talmy, 2000; Barsalou, 1999;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Jackendoff, 1996), the scarcity of
neural data is less than ideal (Kranjec & Chatterjee, 2010).
Therefore, one main goal of the current study concerns
establishing a better understanding of how concepts of
space, time, and causality share organization at the level
of cognition and neural anatomy. Although philosophical
investigations and experimental behavioral studies suggest
that concepts of space, time, and causality may overlap
(e.g., we think about durations [in time] in terms of length
[in space]; an understanding of the asymmetrical nature
of sequential relations is central to both causality and time)
these concepts also clearly refer to distinct kinds of rela-
tions in the world.
Using fMRI and simple verbal materials, the present work
attempts to both find overlap and delineate the boundaries
between these fundamental conceptual domains in so far
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as they might be independently represented in the brain.
As discussed above, the neural basis for spatial and causal
conceptualization has been looked at in isolation. Further-
more and despite much cognitive linguistic and experi-
mental behavioral evidence, the idea that space and time
share representational structure at the conceptual level has
only begun to be investigated using neuroscience methods.
With this in mind, two main objectives motivated the pres-
ent study. First, and most generally, our study addresses
the scarcity of neuroscience research on abstract concep-
tualization. Second, it specifically investigates space, time,
and causality simultaneously—-as a family so to speak—in
recognition of the central and dynamic role these elemental
abstract concepts play in representing events. As described
in the Methods below, the present design aims at dissect-
ing these three basic conceptual components of events. It
does so by testing whether the spatial, temporal, and causal
structure embedded within identical event narratives can be
distinguished using functional imaging. That is, the present
study concerns whether distinct forms of relational thinking
are neurally dissociable within the same event.
METHODS
Stimuli
The question of how we structure events and relate one
event to another with respect to their spatial, temporal,
and causal characteristics is central to the design of the
present study. Consider two simple events, first, with re-
spect to their relative spatio-temporal properties: an ice
cube melting at room temperature and a wine glass shat-
tering to pieces. Compared with an ice cube melting, the
shattering of a glass takes place over a greater extent of
space but occurs over a lesser period of time. This example
illustrates that particular spatial and temporal characteris-
tics of simple events can be orthogonalized. However,
with respect to “causality,” one would be hard pressed to
find any clear causal relation between these two events:
the ice cube melted
the glass shattered
But if another simple event is inserted in between, a cau-
sal chain becomes apparent:
the ice cube melted
the waiter slipped
the glass shattered
This example illustrates that spatial, temporal, and cau-
sal judgments concerning any single event all involve a
relation to another event. With this in mind, we varied
the spatial, temporal, and causal relations between simple
events to construct the stimuli used in the current study.
The stimuli consisted of 252 sentences describing simple
events like the ones in the example above. All sentences
were comprised of three words and took the form of
“the [noun] [verbed]”. Forty-two blocks of six-sentence
sequences were constructed. Each was organized around
a general theme (see Appendix). In each block of themat-
ically related sentences, the sequential order of the six
sentences was fixed. During stimulus construction, in deter-
mining the placement of a sentence in the sequence of
events, the spatial, temporal, and causal relations between
contiguous pairs (that would serve as the basis for making
comparisons) were varied. For the purposes of the present
study, spatial comparisons between two adjacent events
concerned their relative areas, and temporal comparisons
their relative durations. Causal relations were restricted to
nonintentional or mechanical ones; that is, causal relations
that did not require participants to infer the mental states
of goal-directed agents. In addition, 14 blocks of false font
strings were constructed by converting a sample of the
sentence stimuli into Wingdings. False font trials served as
a baseline condition for the fMRI analyses (Kable, Lease-
Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee, 2002). Balancing items on psy-
cholinguistic variables (e.g., concreteness, frequency, etc.)
was unnecessary as the sentences used across conditions
of interest were identical (Table 1).
Participants
Eighteen paid volunteers (10 men, 8 women; mean
age = 25 years; range = 21–32 years) from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania community participated. All were
right-handed, native speakers of English with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. No participants had a history
of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Each gave in-
formed consent in accordance with the institutional review
board of the University of Pennsylvania.
Experimental Design
Participants performed a 1-back task in a fixed-order
blocked design. The instructions varied according to con-
dition. There were four conditions: space, time, causality,
and false font (baseline). A 5-sec instruction slide inform-
ing the participant of the current condition followed by a
Table 1. Example Stimuli and Probable Responses by
Condition
+Space? +Time? +Caused?
the burgers grilled null null null
the wind gusted yes no no
the leaf stirred no no yes
the dog barked yes no no
the squirrel froze no no yes
the rain poured yes yes no
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1-sec blank screen began each block. There were six trials
per block. Each trial was 5 sec separated by a 1-sec inter-
trial interval (see Figure 1). The first trial of each block
was treated as a null trial as no response was required.
This left five critical trials for analysis in each block.
Across all conditions, participants answered either yes
or no by pressing one of two buttons. For critical trials
in the space condition, participants judged whether the
event described in the current trial would likely take
place over a larger area compared with the preceding
event. In the time condition, participants judged whether
the current event would likely occur over a greater dura-
tion compared with the preceding one. In the causality
condition, participants judged whether the current event
was likely to be caused by the preceding one. The stim-
uli were designed such that judgments on a trial-by-trial
basis required participants to determine the likelihood
that two events were related in a particular way; depend-
ing on the block, attention was directed toward the spa-
tial, temporal, or causal relations between them. There
were no explicit correct answers for individual trials. The
direction of responding (e.g., whether a participant judged
a particular event as longer or shorter in duration as com-
pared with another) was unrelated to the final analyses.
Different conditions were intended only to constrain par-
ticipants to a domain-specific mode of thought (space,
time, or causality), whereas the syntax (the [noun]
[verbed]) and binary response (yes or no) was identical
for all stimuli and conditions. For false font trials partici-
pants merely had to determine if a string of nonsense
symbols was identical to a prior string. In this manner,
false font trials did provide an absolute measure for ac-
curacy and served a dual purpose as a baseline condition
for fMRI analyses and as behavioral catch trials to ensure
participants were sufficiently performing the task through-
out the scanning procedure.
Participants saw each of the 252 sentences in either
1 of 14 space, 14 time, or 14 causality blocks, in addi-
tion to 14 false font blocks. The particular condition of
interest (space, time, or causality) that a sentence/block
was presented varied between participants. Pseudorandom
lists were constructed such that across all subjects each
sentence/block was presented approximately the same
number of times in each of the space, time, or causality
conditions. Both the order of condition blocks and the
particular button press that served as a yes or no answer
(left or right button), were counterbalanced between par-
ticipants. The 56 total blocks were distributed across five
runs. The first four runs had 12 blocks, whereas the last
run consisted of eight blocks.
Figure 1. Experimental design for conditions of interest (A) and baseline task (B). Correct answers to an example block of the baseline task
are shown.
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Pilot Study
A pilot study (n = 38) using an identical design was con-
ducted out of the scanner on a laptop computer. (Par-
ticipants from the pilot study were not used in the fMRI
study.) On the basis of demonstrating chance performance
on the false font task, three participantsʼ pilot data were
excluded from all subsequent analyses. Of the remaining
35 participants, mean accuracy on false font trials was
91.2% and mean RT was 1454 msec. The pilot study re-
vealed significant RT differences between the three condi-
tions of interest (Mtime = 2745 msec, Mspace = 2584 msec,
Mcausality = 2313 msec; one-way ANOVA, F(2, 68) = 51.52,
p < .01; post hoc tests, t(1) all ps < .01). The RT differ-
ences were pervasive, such that removing particular blocks
would not have equated conditions. Therefore, it was
decided before carrying out the fMRI study that RT would
be modeled as a covariate of noninterest during image
analyses.
Imaging Procedures
Participants were familiarized with the task on a laptop
computer before entering a 3-T Siemens Trio scanner
using an eight-channel surface array head coil. For the ex-
periment, the stimuli were back-projected onto a screen
at the back of the scanner bore. In the scanner, partici-
pants lied down while viewing the stimuli through a mirror
mounted on the head coil. BOLD-sensitive, T2* weighted
functional images were acquired in 3-mm isotropic voxels
using a gradient-echo, echoplanar pulse sequence (TR =
3000 msec, TEeff = 30 msec). Forty 3-mm slices were ac-
quired during each repetition, with each slice containing
a 64° × 64° matrix within a 192 × 192 mm field of view.
Head motion was minimized using foam padding, and
the scanner performed both prospective (3-D Prospective
Acquisition Correction, PACE) and retrospective motion
correction on-line. High-resolution T1-weighted anatomi-
cal images were acquired for each participant using an
MPRAGE pulse sequence (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec,
TI = 950 msec). One hundred and sixty 1-mm slices were
acquired, with each slice containing a 256° × 256° matrix
within a 250 × 250 mm field of view. The participants per-
formed no task during the first 6 sec of each functional
scan (i.e., run) whereas the subsequent 6 sec represented
the instruction screen for the first trial. This permitted
12 sec for steady-state magnetization to be attained. During
the experiment, manual presses recording yes–no re-
sponses and RT were transmitted using a custom-designed
fiber optic button box.
fMRI Data Analyses
Functional MRI data processing was performed using
VoxBo software (www.voxbo.org) developed at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvaniaʼs Center for Functional Neuroimaging.
After image reconstruction, the data were preprocessed in
four main steps. First, the data were sinc-interpolated
in time to correct for staggered slice acquisition (Aguirre,
Zarahn, & DʼEsposito, 1998). Second, using a procedure
based on one used in the SPM analysis package (www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), a six-parameter, least-squareminimiza-
tion motion correction algorithm was applied to realign all
functional data to the first image acquired for each partici-
pant in a scanning session. Third, the data were automati-
cally thresholded to exclude extraparenchymal voxels from
subsequent analyses. The scan-wise global signals and
power spectra were also derived and stored at this stage.
Finally, parameters permitting normalization of the data
to a standardized (Montreal Neurological Institute) space
were automatically calculated.
A voxel-wise analysis was performed for each par-
ticipant using a modified version of the general linear
model for serially correlated error terms (Aguirre, Zarahn,
& DʼEsposito, 1997; Zarahn, Aguirre, & DʼEsposito, 1997).
This analysis identifies the voxels whose activity was sig-
nificantly associated with the task covariate (i.e., the space,
time, and causality conditions in contrast with the false
font condition). The task covariate was a boxcar waveform
convolved with an estimate of the BOLD hemodynamic
transfer function empirically derived from the motor cor-
tex in a large group of participants (Aguirre et al., 1998).
For each participant, the voxels demonstrating a higher
activity for space, time, and causality conditions relative
to the false font baseline were identified. Random effects
analyses were used for all group analyses and were mea-
sured by calculating the t value of the averaged time series
of each voxel at the whole-brain level. Main effects for each
condition identified significant voxels against baseline. For
the subtractions, the distribution of t values across partici-
pants for a particular condition of interest was contrasted
against the average of the remaining two to determine
whether particular voxels showed preferential activation
to the unique spatial, temporal, or causal attributes of an
event relation (i.e., space > time and causality; time >
space and causality; causality > space and time). False
discovery rate (FDR) control was achieved with a proce-
dure first described by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)
and adapted for brain image analysis by Genovese, Lazar,
& Nichols (2002). The procedure allows one to identify a
threshold that controls the expected proportion of false
positives. In the current data set, selecting a false discovery
rate (q value) of 0.05 yields a t threshold for each analysis
of interest. This means that of the total number of voxels
in an analysis with t values exceeding this threshold, the
expected proportion of false positives is 5%. Cluster size
was limited to those ≥10, which in combination with
FDR control makes for a conservative threshold. Over-
all, two analyses as described above were performed.
In one, RT for each participant on a trial-by-trial basis
was modeled as a covariate of noninterest. In the other,
RT was not included in the model (see Imaging Results
section).
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Significant RT differences concordant with the pilot study
were found between conditions of interest (Mtime =
2547 msec, Mspace = 2334 msec, Mcausality = 2097 msec;
one-way ANOVA, F(2, 28) = 14.33, p = .02; post hoc
tests, t(1), all ps < .01). Accuracy and RT on the false
font task was also comparable to that for the pilot study
(RT: Mfalse font = 1231 msec; accuracy: M = 91.8%;
range = 78.6–98.6%). Across all responses there were
fewer yes trials (45.8%) as compared with no trials (54.2%)
[χ2(1, n = 3112) = 11.08, p < .001]; however, the pro-
portion of yes-and-no trials did not differ between con-
ditions of interest [χ2(2, n = 3112) = 0.77, p = .68].
Additionally, the proportion of trials on which participants
made a response compared with trials where no response
was recorded was noted as an index of general alertness.
These proportions did not vary significantly by condition,
and overall, participants failed to make a response on
fewer than 2% of all trials. Participant exclusion was deter-
mined on the basis of nine behavioral variables (four condi-
tion RT variables, four condition response–no response
proportions, and false font accuracy) using a multivariate
method for indentifying outliers (Mahalanobis distance,
p < .01; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Two participants
were categorized as outliers, and their fMRI data were
excluded from further image analyses. A third subjectʼs
fMRI data were not included in the group analyses as she
self-reported doing a cognitively demanding secondary
task during the baseline condition. Thus, a total of 15 par-
ticipantsʼ data (eight men and seven women; mean age =
25 years; range = 21–32 years) were included in the final
fMRI analyses.
Imaging Results
Condition of Interest Subtractions
(See Figure 2 for statistical maps and Table 2 for anatomi-
cal descriptions, coordinate information, cluster sizes, and
t values.)
Space. Relative to the other two conditions of interest,
space trials elicited significant patterns of activation in
bilateral occipitoparietal and frontal areas [t ≥ 3.197,
q(FDR) = .05]. Greater right-lateralized effects were ob-
served in the superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus,
and precuneus. Activations in inferior parietal lobules
were relatively more prominent in the left hemisphere.
Bilateral effects in the parietal lobule extended to the
supramarginal gyrus in the left hemisphere and the an-
gular gyrus in the right (or white matter directly under-
cutting these areas). The peak voxel for the space > time
and causality subtraction was in the left supramarginal
gyrus located within this largest cluster of active voxels
in the inferior parietal lobule (see Figure 3).
Causality. Most notably, causality more than space and
time trials yielded significant cortical activations in bilat-
eral frontal and middle temporal gyri, left insula, and a
left-lateralized portion of the SMA [t ≥ 3.625, q(FDR) =
.05]. Although frontal activations included those in the
right inferior frontal gyrus, left-lateralized activations were
more robust. The peak voxel for the causality > space
and time subtraction was located in a large cluster of active
voxels in the left medial frontal gyrus. A cluster of signifi-
cant voxels extending all the way from the anterior pole
to posterior portions of the left middle temporal gyrus
was the largest and remarkably cohesive (see Figure 3).
A number of subcortical regions were also active for cau-
sality more than other trial types. These included effects in
bilateral cerebellar areas and the left caudate of the BG.
Time. When contrasted with space and causality condi-
tions, time trials produced no significant effects [q(FDR) ≤
.05]. Because RT was modeled as a covariate of noninterest,
initially we speculated that this feature of the analysis
might have contributed to the lack of significant effects.
RTs were longer for time trials relative to all other condi-
tions. Therefore, when making direct contrasts, covarying
for RT reduces the amount of activation for time trials while
increasing the amount for space and causality (Kable et al.,
2002). Also, we considered the possibility that mentally
imaging the durations for time trial events might correlate
with RT more so than for other conditions. For these rea-
sons, we performed identical analyses between all condi-
tions of interest, but without covarying for RT. However,
although the pattern of results was remarkably similar for
space and causality conditions, time still produced no sig-
nificant effects. Further ROI analyses in SMA, BG, and the
cerebellum (areas thought to be important for time per-
ception; see references below) found no significant differ-
ences between time main effects and the other conditions.
Summary
Weighted contrasts compared each condition of interest
(space, time, or causality) against the remaining two. There
were several main findings. First, space trials recruited
primarily bilateral frontal and occipitoparietal networks—
areas traditionally associated with various forms of visuo-
spatial processing (Berryhill, Fendrich, & Olson, 2009;
Noordzij et al., 2008; Wu, Morganti, & Chatterjee, 2008;
Wu, Waller, & Chatterjee, 2007; Emmorey et al., 2002;
Damasio et al., 2001; Bisiach, 1999; Haxby et al., 1991;
Vallar & Perani, 1986). Second, causality trials were asso-
ciated with bilateral frontal activations and greater activity
in the left middle temporal gyrus—areas previously found
to underlie causal thinking and thematic role assignment,
respectively (Wu et al., 2007; Satpute et al., 2005; Fonlupt,
2003). However, causality trials also produced activations
in SMA, caudate, and cerebellum—cortical and subcor-
tical sites associated with the perception of time at dif-
ferent timescales, suprasecond and subsecond durations,
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respectively (Coslett et al., 2010; Wencil et al., 2010; Wiener
et al., 2010). Lastly, relative to space and causality con-
ditions, time trials yielded no significant effects. The lack
of effects for time trials was surprising, particularly be-
cause these trials were the most difficult as gauged by
RT and self-reports in debriefings. Furthermore, causality
trials, the easiest trials by the same measures, produced
activations in regions important for time perception. This
pattern of data, indicating negative results for time trials
but positive effects for causality trials in areas important
for time perception, motivated additional analyses in-
tended to further probe relations between domains.
Overlap Relations between Time and Space or Causality
To further quantify relations between conditions, main ef-
fects for space, time, and causality (compared with base-
line; FDR corrected q ≤ .05) were overlaid to create a
combined overlap mask. For present purposes, the most
interesting patterns regarding main effects concern those
voxels that are either unique to a particular condition or
overlap with only a single other condition. (For purposes
of contrasting relations between representations of space,
time, and causality, voxels implicated by all conditions
are as uninformative as voxels activated by none of the
conditions.) Therefore, we counted the total number of
voxels unique to a particular main effect and the number
involved in two-way overlaps between conditions. Of par-
ticular interest were the number of voxels activated by
time trials that either overlapped with voxels activated by
space or causality trials. Because no significant effects were
found for the time versus space and causality subtraction,
it was thought that an examination of main effects overlap
in this manner could reveal something about conceptual
Figure 2. Imaging results
for condition of interest
subtractions.
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relations between time and other domains. As displayed in
Figure 4A, this analysis revealed that there were fewer over-
lapping voxels for space and time (S&T: 282 voxels) and
space and causality (S&C: 267 voxels) compared with the
numbers of voxels for causality and time (C&T: 1207 vox-
els). Figure 4B illustrates that for all voxels activated for
time, the percentage of overlapping voxels activated for
both causality and time trials (C&T: 65.0%) is greater than
the percentage of overlapping voxels activated on space
and time trials (S&T: 15.2%; test of proportions, p < .05).
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of voxels activated by
time trials overlapping with either space (pink) or causality
(green) trials. The overall pattern suggests a left hemi-
sphere bias. Most notable areas of overlap between causality
Table 2. Peak Activations by Condition Subtractions
Anatomical Region Brodmannʼs Area
Talairach
Size tx y z
Space > Time and Causality
Middle frontal gyrus (R) 4/6 27 −1 58 114 4.97
Middle frontal gyrus (R) 46 42 31 18 114 5.85
Inferior parietal lobule (R) 40 54 −39 54 297 5.45
Inferior temporal gyrus (R) 37 63 −65 −8 40 4.76
Precuneus (R) 19 36 −74 37 269 5.37
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 46 −48 33 18 21 3.72
Superior frontal gyrus (L) 11 −27 46 −16 10 3.99
Inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 −39 −39 38 394 6.15
Middle occipital gyrus (L) 37 −53 −62 −7 70 4.84
Superior occipital gyrus (L) 19 −39 −83 22 67 4.66
Posterior cingulate (L) 30 −21 −55 15 14 4.02
Causality > Space and Time
Inferior frontal gyrus (R) 45 54 21 7 11 4.22
Inferior frontal gyrus (R) 13 30 12 −12 13 4.10
Middle temporal gyrus (R) 21 56 −29 −4 190 5.72
Anterior middle temporal gyrus (R) 21 53 4 −28 186 6.19
Cerebellum (pyramis) (R) − 21 −77 −29 104 5.36
Superior frontal gyrus (L) 8 −9 38 53 21 5.37
Superior frontal gyrus (SMA) (L) 6/19 −6 15 63 62 5.47
Medial frontal gyrus (L) 9 −3 48 25 277 6.91
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 6 −42 15 52 39 5.00
Postcentral gyrus (L) 3 −54 −10 50 13 4.87
Insula (L) 13 −30 15 −6 198 5.05
Middle temporal gyrus (L) 22 −53 −38 −1 558 5.54
Caudate (L) – 9 4 11 31 5.28
Cerebellum (pyramis) (L) – −24 −77 −31 37 5.08
Time > Space and Causality
Ø
L = left; R = right.
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and time trials are in the left middle frontal gyrus and SMA.
For space and time overlap, the most salient result is a
negative one. There are few substantial areas of overlap,
although some shared voxels for space and time in bilat-
eral regions of the precuneus are noteworthy. Overall
though, the overlap analyses suggest a much closer
correspondence between time and causality than between
time and space.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Cognitive neuroscience has traditionally focused on the
semantics of concrete objects (Forde & Humphreys, 1999;
Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio,
1997; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Warrington & Shallice,
1984), a trend that has carried over to more recent imag-
ing studies (Thompson-Schill, Kan, & Oliver, 2006; Martin,
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999;
Cappa, Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti, & Fazio, 1998). Whereas
much is currently known about how the brain categorizes
things like faces, animals, and tools based on concrete
features like size, color, and shape, much less is known
about how abstract relations between events are neurally in-
stantiated. Thus, we know relatively more about the “what”
of semantic representation than we do about the “where,”
“when,” and “why” of it. This more abstract level of repre-
sentation is particularly important for understanding event
semantics and, more generally, the ability to think in terms
of abstract relations may best explain “why weʼre so smart”
(Gentner, 2003). Space, time, and causality provide a nat-
ural framework for organizing the features of events. Only
more recently has attention in cognitive neuroscience been
paid to these abstract categories of experience (Amorapanth
et al., 2010; Speer et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2007; Kemmerer,
1999, 2005, 2006; Satpute et al., 2005; Tranel & Kemmerer,
2004; Fonlupt, 2003; Chatterjee, 2001; Zacks & Tversky,
2001; Kemmerer & Tranel, 2000). Using fMRI, we tested
whether the spatial, temporal, and causal structure em-
bedded within identical narratives could be neurally distin-
guished within the same event relations. We found that
spatial and causal relations were more easily segregated
than temporal ones. However, time appeared to be more
closely coupled with causality than space. To our knowl-
edge, these three specific foundational components of
events have not been looked at within an identical narrative
structure before the current study.
We found that thinking about space, more than cau-
sality and time, activated bilateral frontal gyri, inferior
parietal, and middle occipital regions, with a peak acti-
vation recorded in the left supramarginal gyrus. These
activations are consistent with previous studies investigat-
ing spatial processing. Evidence in support of a general
Figure 3. Sagittal views of main results (see Table 2) for condition
of interest subtractions.
Figure 4. The absolute (A) and relative extent (B) of overlap between
main effects for all conditions.
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right hemispheric bias for attending to spatial infor-
mation was provided by frontal activations in primarily
right-lateralized middle and superior gyri; anterorolandic
activations—that is, in regions outside occipitoparietal
areas more typically implicated in deficits of spatial at-
tention (Vallar & Perani, 1986)—were right-lateralized.
However, peak activation in the left supramarginal gyrus
is consistent with work that finds a left hemisphere bias
for representing categorical spatial relational informa-
tion, particularly in inferior parietal areas (Amorapanth
et al., 2010; Noordzij et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2007, 2008;
Emmorey et al., 2002; Damasio et al., 2001; Kosslyn et al.,
1989, 1998; Kosslyn, 1987). Remarkably, activations in
middle occipital regions, along the “where” visual pro-
cessing pathway (Haxby et al., 1991), suggest that, even
during a verbal task such as the one used presently, spatial-
specific information, as compared with other abstract con-
cepts tested, was more closely associated with vision. This
suggests that spatial relational thinking, although arguably
supramodal in nature (Barsalou, 1999; Farah,Wong,Monheit,
& Morrow, 1989; Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio,
1988), is more closely linked to vision than is thinking about
causal and temporal relations.
Causality, more than space and time, was also associ-
ated with bilateral effects, but showed particularly large
clusters of activation in the left middle temporal gyrus,
and peaked in the left medial frontal gyrus. Frontal acti-
vations are common to the few fMRI studies investigating
causality at the conceptual level. For example, Satpute et al.
(2005) contrasted judgments of causal or associative rela-
tions between the same word pairs (e.g., “wind–erosion”)
finding significant activation in the left dorsolateral pFC for
causal, more than associative, judgments. Notably, this study
also found activations in right precuneus for the same con-
trast, suggesting the possibility that abstracting the spatial
(event) structure evoked by certain word pairs could fac-
tor into thinking about causal relations during their task.
Another fMRI study (Fonlupt, 2003) contrasted participantsʼ
conceptual judgments of causality with their perception of
causality using simple launching events. This study found
increased activity in medial frontal cortex when participants
were explicitly instructed to search for a causal relation, re-
gardless of whether the launching event was actually con-
strued as caused or uncaused. That is, simply thinking
about causal relations activated frontal areas, even when
the spatio-temporal details of the event did not result in
the perception of causality. Moreover, passively perceiving
caused events did not activate these areas more than pas-
sively perceiving noncaused events did.
Activations in middle temporal gyrus resonate with find-
ings from a previous patient study from our laboratory. Wu
et al. (2007) investigated thematic role assignment using
tasks that required patients to map the thematic role (i.e.,
agent–recipient relations), or code who does what to
whom, onto actors embedded within a very simple narra-
tive structure. Patients had to either (1) match a sentence
(e.g., “the circle kicked the square”) with a picture depicting
the same simple event or (2) infer the consequences of
similar actions involving agents and recipients in (A) verbal
and (B) nonverbal tasks. Damage to middle temporal re-
gions impaired performance on all three thematic relation
tasks. These concordant results are sensible, given that
assigning thematic role in such a fashion is essentially de-
termining the cause and effect of an action.
Also noteworthy, the left SMA and bilateral cerebellar
areas showed significant effects for causality more than
other trial types. However, these activations are interest-
ing primarily because both the motor and perceptual
components of subsecond timing tasks have been local-
ized to subcortical networks, including the cerebellum
Figure 5. Distribution of
voxels activated by time trials
overlapping with either space
(pink) or causality (green) trials.
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and BG, and suprasecond timing tasks to SMA and pFC in
a number of fMRI studies (Wencil et al., 2010; Wiener
et al., 2010). That is, despite finding no significant ac-
tivity for time relative to both space and causality, cau-
sality trials produced relatively larger effects in brain
regions thought to be important for representing time.
Although this result was somewhat unexpected, we
sought to better understand it by means of examining
the total number of voxels and patterns of overlap for
each main effect relative to one another. The results of
these analyses suggest that thinking about the temporal
relations between simple events has more in common
with thinking about their causal relations than either
(time or causality) have in common with space. This is
to say, the functional–anatomical overlap between time
and causality suggest that these two domains are closely
linked cognitively.
This finding is especially notable considering that some
current theoretical accounts would predict a different pat-
tern of results. For example, several cognitive models of
cross-domain conceptual representation suggest that rela-
tively abstract concepts (e.g., time) are structured in terms
of more salient or relatively concrete concepts (like space)
(Casasanto, 2009; Boroditsky, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson,
1999; Clark, 1973). More generally, spatial representations
are thought to have a special involvement in structuring
language and thought (Pinker, 2007; Chatterjee, 2001;
Bloom, Peterson, Nadel, & Garrett, 1996). There is an
especially fast growing literature demonstrating that we
talk and think about temporal concepts using spatial ab-
stractions (Kranjec & McDonough, 2011; Kranjec, Cardillo,
Schmidt, & Chatterjee, 2010; Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto &
Boroditsky, 2008; Nunez & Sweetser, 2006; Boroditsky,
2000). For example, duration is conceptualized in terms
of length. The present task found little evidence in sup-
port of the idea that temporal concepts find grounding
in neural areas associated with the representation of spa-
tial relations. However, evidence that temporal thinking
shares neural structure with causal thinking was found.
Although investigations concerning the relations be-
tween causality and temporal concepts are less common
than those between space and time, there are several
reasons to think that causal concepts are particularly im-
portant for structuring language and thought in general,
and that time in particular may play an important role
in this.
The capacity to represent and invert the thematic roles
of agents and recipients in relation to verbs is an important
feature of language, allowing one to understand that Man
Bites Dog is a newsworthy headline but Dog Bites Man is
not. But thematic assignment also necessarily entails in-
formation about the beginning and end states of simple
actions or events that depends on more basic represen-
tations of causal and temporal relations. Time may be
thought to be even more basic than causality in this re-
spect; to conceptualize causality—i.e., to comprehend that
causes always precede effects—one must be able to per-
ceive duration and temporal order. A prior fMRI study
from our laboratory, investigating the spatial and temporal
components of perceptual causality, found that subjects
more often used timing information when making causal
judgments about Michotte-like launching events (Straube
& Chatterjee, 2010). Sequence relations between time
and causality can impact sentence comprehension; ERP
evidence suggests that relations between two causally
related events expressed in their actual temporal order
of occurrence are easier to comprehend than when the
same events are expressed in an inverted order (Munte,
Schiltz, & Kutas, 1998). However, as situation models of
discourse comprehension explain (Zwaan, 1999), temporal
discontinuities in narratives are permitted (although
with some cognitive cost) whereas a lack of causal cohe-
sion can make a story very hard to follow or completely
absurd.
Although our task used very simple verbal stimuli to focus
on event processing at an intentionally abstract, conceptual
level (the stimuli contained no explicit spatial, temporal, or
causal language), a body of research concerned with com-
plex text comprehension and higher-level inference mak-
ing is relevant to the present discussion (for reviews, see
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Friederici, 2007; Mason & Just,
2006; Mar, 2004). A general result found among these stud-
ies shows the involvement of fronto-medial and anterio-
temporal regions during evaluative inferencing.Of particular
interest to the current study, some research in this area has
investigated neural regions associated with the spatial, tem-
poral, and/or causal aspects of complex texts while partici-
pants read or listen to complex text (Cooper, Hasson, &
Small, 2011; Speer et al., 2009; Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007;
Virtue, Haberman, Clancy, Parrish, & Beeman, 2006; Ferstl,
Rinck, & von Cramon, 2005; Mason & Just, 2004). These
higher-level language comprehension tasks that attempt to
contrast two or more domains tend to include materials
with explicit spatial, temporal, or causal language to cue
domain-specific processing (e.g., the noises from “above”
vs. the movie after “midnight”). (In contrast, the present
study uses identical language between conditions of in-
terest and strips this language of domain-specific content
using the standardized schematic construction the [noun]
[verbed]). Despite differences in theoretical orientation
and the materials used, some findings from this literature
converge with those of the present study. For example,
several studies demonstrate activations in superior and
middle temporal gyri during “semantic integration” or when
sentences are causally linked (Virtue et al., 2006; Mason
& Just, 2004). Just and colleagues (Just et al., 2006; Just,
Newman, Keller, McEleney, & Carpenter, 2004) found that
high spatial imagery sentences activated the left intraparietal
sulcus, hypothesizing a parietal “spatial network” for en-
coding spatial information relevant to situation models for
text comprehension (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Ferstl
and colleagues (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2007; Ferstl et al.,
2005) found bilateral fronto-parietal regions for spatial con-
tent during story comprehension and left prefrontal areas
Kranjec et al. 11
for processing temporal information. Overall, the present
results are consistent much of the higher-level language
comprehension literature showing increased language and
inferencing demands while processing causal information
(in middle temporal gyrus and frontal regions, respectively)
and modality-specific effects in occipotoparietal regions
while processing spatial information.
Conclusion
Thinking about causal relations, even when none are
warranted, is arguably our most overarching conceptual
bias. It may be peculiar to human beings and is argued
by some to be responsible for driving the evolution of
human reasoning and other species-specific behaviors
like tool use (Tomasello, 1999). The tendency to construe
two events as causally related is particularly powerful for
humans. It is the same tendency that drives superstitious
thinking and beliefs about other kinds of spurious cor-
relations (Wolpert, 2006, 2009). In fact, inferring causal
relations between events in a narrative may occur uninten-
tionally and without awareness (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman,
2002).
So where our laboratory finds a bottom–up bias toward
using temporal (more than spatial) cues to represent the
perception of causality (Straube & Chatterjee, 2010), the
present work suggests a top–down bias where causal
concepts may partly subsume temporal ones. However,
both lines of research suggest that time, more than space,
is linked to our judgments of causality. In relating time and
causality, our findings suggest that time is more basic
ontologically but causality is more salient phenomenologi-
cally. This characterization of the two domains as they re-
late to one another is mirrored in the way that time and
causality are typically understood at perceptual and con-
ceptual levels of representation. At the perceptual level,
causality is portrayed as something (more abstract) that
emerges from the (more concrete) spatio-temporal com-
ponents of physical events (e.g., even a small temporal
delay during a billiard ball “launching” eliminates the per-
ception of a caused event). However, when thinking about
event relations at a conceptual level, (more abstract) tem-
porality is relatively vague and imprecise as compared with
the (more concrete) causal relations that automatically
link events in a narrative (e.g., causal inconsistencies in a
narrative are very jarring, whereas temporal distortions
are tolerated). Portraying time and causality as such pre-
dicts that neural areas important for time perception would
be involved with understanding causality (consistent with
an “embodied” view of abstract conceptualization), but that
understanding causality would recruit relatively more re-
sources when comparing the same events at a conceptual
level. This is the conclusion supported by the pattern
of observed neural results here. Sensorimotor areas for
timing may be critical for representing causality, but, as
evidenced by the lack of effects for the time condition sub-
traction and the relatively high degree of overlap between
temporal and causal main effects activations, it is difficult
not to experience causality when thinking about the tem-
poral components of events.
Complementing previous patient work from our labo-
ratory (Wu et al., 2007) and the neural literature on text
comprehension (see Discussion above), the current study
demonstrates that spatial and causal relations can be sepa-
rated in the brain, with fronto-parietal andmiddle temporal
cortical regions implicated as particularly important for
representing these respective forms of relational thought.
Temporal relations, however, were not as clearly segre-
gated, but the present study also found perceptual motor
areas activated for both spatial and causal relations. The
pattern of results have interesting implications for simula-
tion theories and other sensorimotor or embodied cogni-
tion accounts of semantic representation (Casasanto, 2009;
Zwaan, 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Talmy, 2000;
Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Jackendoff, 1996).
Looking at effects in neural areas subserving perception,
we find that spatial relations were more strongly associated
with activations in occipital areas critical for visual process-
ing, and causal relations in the SMA, BG, and cerebellum—
areas thought to be important for time perception at dif-
ferent scales (Wiener et al., 2010). Whereas prominent
embodied views of abstract conceptualization suggest that
we commonly talk and think about relatively abstract
domains in terms of more concrete domains (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999), the present results suggest something
slightly different. That is, at a neural level, it may be more
useful to think about space and causality as our most cen-
tral and overarching organizing concepts, with each being
more or less embodied in a particular perceptual motor
system, that is, vision and timing systems, respectively. So
although space may be more concrete than time by some
accounts (because of visionʼs central place in structuring
human experience), time may be more basic than a con-
cept like causality according to others.
Much is known about how time perception is neurally
instantiated. However, we know very little about how ab-
stract concepts—especially time—are represented in the
brain (Kranjec & Chatterjee, 2010). The present data indi-
cate that our concepts of time and causality are not easily
distinguished at a neural level. More generally, these data
also suggest that embodied accounts should be careful
when using terms like concrete and abstract when describ-
ing very basic categories of experience. In relating space,
time, and causality to each other, a particular domainʼs
classification as relatively concrete or abstract can shift, de-
pending on whether one is operating at a perceptual or
conceptual level of representation. In this regard, the do-
main of time can be particularly indefinite. Saint Augustine
(398/1961) famously wrote, “What then is time? If no one
ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks,
I know not” (p. 301). Time may be very abstract when
we need to think about it, but in some respects, nothing
could be more basic at a neural level of representation.
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